Research

Publications | Drafts | Doctoral dissertation | Presentations

At the most general level, the sorts of philosophical questions that have always gripped me most are those that take up the project of understanding, theorizing and evaluating human reasoning, attitudes and mental states. Most of what I have worked on to date is ultimately united by this general theme.


Publications

Original articles

“What is (in)coherence?,” forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 13 (show abstract | penultimate version | extended version)

“What to believe about your belief that you’re in the good case,” forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 6 (show abstract | penultimate version)

“Isolating correct reasoning,” forthcoming in Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking, Oxford University Press) (show abstract | penultimate version)

“The conflict of evidence and coherence,” forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (show abstract | final version (Online Early View))

“Metanormative contextualism and normative uncertainty” (with John Pittard), Mind, 126(501), 2017 (show abstract | final version)

“Cryptonormative judgments,” European Journal of Philosophy, 25(1), 2017 (show abstract | final version)

“Belief, credence, and the preface paradox,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 94(3), 2016 (show abstract | final version)

“Moral reasons, epistemic reasons, and rationality,” Philosophical Quarterly, 66(263), 2016 (show abstract | final version)

“IIA, rationality, and the individuation of options” (with Tina Rulli), Philosophical Studies, 173(1), 2016 (show abstract | final version)

“Possibly false knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy, 112(5), 2015 (show abstract | unformatted final version | final version )

“Narrow-scoping for wide-scopers,” Synthese, 192(8), 2015 (show abstract | final version)

“Hobbes and normative egoism,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 97(4), 2015 (show abstract | final version)

“Two kinds of stakes,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 96(3), 2015 (show abstract | final version)

“Disagreement about disagreement? What disagreement about disagreement?,” Philosophers’ Imprint, 14(18), 2014 (show abstract | final version)

Literature review/overview articles

“Contextualism and knowledge norms,” in Jonathan Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, Routledge, 2017 (show abstract | penultimate version | final version)

Discussion notes and book reviews

“Explanatory indispensability and deliberative indispensability: against Enoch’s analogy,” Thought, 5(4), 2016 (show abstract | penultimate version | final version)

Review of Daniel Star, Knowing Better, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2016 (final version)

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Drafts

“Eliminating prudential reasons” (show abstract | draft)

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Doctoral dissertation

Rationality’s Demands on Belief (show abstract | final version)

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Recent and forthcoming presentations

(Selection only; see CV for full list)

Original papers

Title TBC, USC/Shandong Conference on Ethics and Epistemology, Shandong University (May 2018)

Title TBC, Cambridge University (December 2017)

Title TBC, King’s College London (December 2017)

Title TBC, Workshop on Varieties of Normativity, Uppsala University (December 2017)

“Conditionalization reimagined,” New Trends in Epistemology Workshop, University of Hamburg (October 2017)

“Reasons, rationality, reasoning: how much pulling-apart?,” Workshop on Themes from the Moral Philosophy of John Broome, National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) (September 2017)

“What is (in)coherence?,” University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (September 2017)

“Incoherence and the wrong kind of reason,” UNC-KCL Workshop on Reasons, UNC-Chapel Hill (June 2017)

“What is (in)coherence?,” Fordham Epistemology & Ethics Workshop (February 2017)

“Eliminating prudential reasons,” Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics (January 2017)

“Evidential parity and anti-skeptical assumptions,” Society for Skeptical Studies, APA Eastern Division Meeting (January 2017)

“The metaethics of coherence,” Chapel Hill Metaethics Workshop (September 2016)

“Explanatory indispensability and deliberative indispensability: against Enoch’s analogy,” Realism in Ethics Workshop, University of Sheffield (July 2016)

“Metanormative contextualism and normative uncertainty,” New York Philosophy of Language Workshop (February 2016)

“Evidence, coherence, and anti-skeptical assumptions,” Union College Workshop on Critical Reflection and Belief (May 2015)

“Cryptonormative judgments,” University of Notre Dame (February 2015)

“Believing at will as a failure of coherence,” University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (February 2015)

“IIA, rationality, and the individuation of options,” London School of Economics & Political Science (January 2015)

“Believing at will as a failure of coherence,” University of Pittsburgh (January 2015)

“Believing at will as a failure of coherence,” University of California, San Diego (January 2015)

“Cryptonormative judgments,” British Society for Ethical Theory (BSET), University of Cambridge (July 2014)

“Belief, credence, and the preface paradox,” Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society & the Mind Association (July 2014)

“The irrelevance of evidence (to rationality),” St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality (SLACRR)  (May 2014)

“Cryptonormative judgments,” Northwestern University Society for the Theory of Ethics and Politics (NUSTEP) (March 2014)

Invited comments

Faculty Commentator-At-Large, Penn Reasons and Foundations of Epistemology Workshop (November 2016)

On Mark Schroeder (USC), “Expressivism to the Rescue: Graded Belief and the Basicness of Objective Reasons,” Ranch Metaphysics Workshop (January 2016)

On Joshua Schechter (Brown), “Small Steps and Great Leaps in Thought: The Epistemology of Basic Deductive Inference,” Konstanz Reasoning Conference (July 2014)

On Matthew McGrath (Missouri), “Pragmatic Encroachment: Its Problems are Your Problems!,” Southampton Workshop on Epistemic and Practical Normativity: Substantive Connections (June 2014)

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